{"identifier":"CVE-2026-85036","cve":{"id":"CVE-2026-85036","description":"The Bluetooth Classic AVDTP layer defers releasing a session's stream endpoints: bt_avdtp_l2cap_disconnected() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avdtp.c ends with k_work_submit(&session->_release_work), placing the embedded struct k_work on the system work queue's pending list. When the same struct bt_avdtp object is immediately reused for a new signalling connection, the session memory is re-initialized — a2dp_get_connection() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/a2dp.c memset()s the whole struct bt_a2dp, and bt_avdtp_l2cap_accept() / bt_avdtp_connect() call k_work_init() on session->_release_work — while that work item is still linked into k_sys_work_q.pending. Zeroing a linked sys_snode_t truncates the list while its tail pointer keeps pointing past the truncation.\n\nThe reuse window is deterministic rather than a race. All host RX processing runs on the Bluetooth RX work queue at a cooperative priority (CONFIG_BT_RX_PRIO), while _release_work is submitted to the lower-priority system work queue, so the release handler cannot run until the RX thread blocks. Because l2cap_br_recv() processes every signalling command contained in a single L2CAP signalling PDU back-to-back, a peer can send one PDU holding an L2CAP Disconnection Request for the AVDTP signalling channel followed by a Connection Request for PSM 0x0019; the second command reaches the session-reuse path with the release work provably still queued. The peer must already hold an encrypted AVDTP signalling channel, i.e. be a paired/bonded BR/EDR device.\n\nThe result is corruption of the global system work queue's pending list: either the queue silently stops executing any work at all (subsequent submissions are appended to a chain the head can no longer reach, and the orphaned items keep their K_WORK_QUEUED flag forever) or, in the tail variant, the list acquires a self-referencing node that the queue thread spins on. The written values are pointers to other struct k_work objects and are not attacker-controlled, so the impact is a device-wide, reboot-required denial of service rather than a controllable write primitive. Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_A2DP are affected.\n\nThe fix is a two-commit unit, and neither commit closes the path on its own. ec822ceed83b adds a pending-release check to bt_avdtp_connect() and bt_avdtp_l2cap_accept(), but the A2DP upper layer's a2dp_get_connection() memset()s the session — including the queued work item's list node and flags — before those checks run, so k_work_busy_get() would observe an already-cleared state. 2bd5ea88c69b closes that by making a2dp_get_connection() itself skip the reuse and return NULL while the release work is still pending, which both callers already handle by rejecting the connection attempt. Apply both commits together; either one alone leaves the device vulnerable.","published":"2026-11-04T06:17:06.200000+00:00","modified":"2026-11-09T22:18:55.577000+00:00","status":"Awaiting Analysis","score":5.7,"severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","cvss_version":"3.1","affected":[],"weaknesses":["CWE-666"],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/2bd5ea88c69bdd94fc5a9e6757b29e1de9903ef5","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/ec822ceed83b5008d4a28700fdacf2ff80020963","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-ffxg-752w-mv9x","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}],"kev":null,"kev_checked":true,"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":5.7,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":2.1,"impactScore":3.6}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-11-09T21:28:28.761677Z","id":"CVE-2026-85036","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[],"source":"nvd","retrieved_at":"2026-11-10T02:16:56.753796+00:00","exploited":false,"kev_stale":false,"products":[],"priority":{"label":"Assess exposure and vendor guidance","reasons":["No higher-priority signal is available in the current stored evidence."]},"epss":{"probability":0.00211,"percentile":0.11486,"date":"2026-11-18","stale":false},"version_assessment":null},"news":[],"campaigns":[],"domains":[{"domain":"github.com","source_url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/2bd5ea88c69bdd94fc5a9e6757b29e1de9903ef5","investigate_url":"https://investigate.aeglixmind.com/#github.com"}],"arsenal_url":"https://arsenal.aeglixmind.com/?cve=CVE-2026-85036","catalog_url":"https://cves.aeglixmind.com/cve/CVE-2026-85036","research_url":"https://investigate.aeglixmind.com/research/cve/CVE-2026-85036","coverage":{"news_candidates_checked":0,"campaign_candidates_checked":0,"bounded":false,"notice":"Exact CVE mentions in stored public excerpts and reviewed campaign content only. A mention is not proof of exploitation, attribution or tool suitability. Missing matches do not establish absence."}}